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We show that exposure to foreign currency debt does not necessarily increase the risk of having a 
financial crisis. Some countries do not suffer from financial fragility despite original sin. Before 
1913 British offshoots and Scandinavia afflicted with it avoided financial meltdowns. Today 
many advanced countries have original sin but few have had crises. In both periods, aggregate 
balance sheet mismatches are associated with a greater likelihood of a crisis. The evidence 
suggests that foreign currency debt is dangerous when mis-managed. This is part of the difference 
between developed countries and emerging markets both of which borrow in foreign currency.  
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  The period from 1870-1913 was a period of globalization in both goods and 
financial markets comparable to the present era of globalization. It was also a period 
rife with emerging market financial crises with great resonance for the experience that 
we have observed in the past decade. In both eras many emerging countries faced 
frequent currency crises, banking crises and twin crises. They also faced a number of 
debt crises coming on the heels of banking and currency trouble. In both periods 
many of these countries suffered from what Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) refer 
to as original sin. The external debt that they accumulated to finance their 
development was almost strictly denominated in foreign currency or in terms of gold 
(or had gold clauses) before 1914, just as emerging market debt today is largely 
denominated in dollars, euros or yen. When the exchange rate depreciates, debt 
service in gold or foreign currency becomes very difficult leading to an increased 
likelihood of default, the consequent drying up of external funding and economic 
collapse. 
  The emerging country experience stands in contrast to that of the advanced 
core countries which are financially mature, have credibility and either issue bonds 
denominated in terms of their own currency or manage their hard currency debt 
carefully.  There were few crises in these countries. This leads us to ask whether debt 
structure or other factors explain differences in crisis incidence. So in addition to 
looking into original sin as a determinant of crises, we investigate whether balance 
sheet mismatches (cf. Goldstein and Turner, 2004) or poor reputation and debt 
intolerance (cf. Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano 2003) matter. 
  We have developed a database to allow us to identify and distinguish original 
sin and balance sheet crises from more traditional currency and banking crises for 
roughly 30 countries (both advanced and emerging) from 1880-1913 and over 40 
countries between 1972 and 1997 the post-Bretton Woods period. We have data both 
on type of crisis incidence and on the fundamentals that economists believe are 
determinants of crises.
1 
                                                            
1 A caveat worth keeping in mind is that the original sin data and our mismatch data especially in the 
recent period are fairly incomplete and researchers still lack the coverage necessary to make definitive 
conclusions. Our data set is also somewhat unique in that the coverage and quality of the available data 
from 100 years ago are better than contemporary data. Nevertheless, we use the data of limited quality 
as a determinant of the probability of having a particular type of crisis using standard pooled probit 




  Our results do not find unambiguous support for the idea that hard currency 
debt is always associated with more financial turbulence. In fact, we find evidence 
that countries with significant or full-blown original sin can be divided into two sub-
groups. Today countries like Greece, Ireland, Israel, Spain, Sweden, and Singapore 
have had relatively few crises. On the other hand, countries like Argentina, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Indonesia and Brazil seem to suffer from financial fragility, manifested by 
more frequent and more encompassing crises.  We also find an historical parallel in 
the late nineteenth century. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, and the US had 
relatively little trouble with financial crises in terms of frequency or virulence but all 
were afflicted with high original sin. We discuss these differing experiences and 
conclude by illustrating that good financial management of the original sin condition, 
strong financial development and agile responsiveness to crises seem to explain the 








    Current work on the mechanics of crises suggests that banking trouble, 
currency crises and debt crises are inter-related phenomena. This is different from the 
first generation literature on currency crises that viewed these events as arising from 
unsustainable fiscal policy under a pegged exchange rate. It is also different from a 
strand of the literature which views banking crises as arising uniquely from poor 
supervision, weak structure or stochastic liquidity runs. Our view is that while some 
countries had crises that unfolded in ways the older generation of models would 
predict, other countries faced financial meltdown by having twin (banking and 
currency crises) or even triple crises, where, in addition to a large depreciation and 
disruption in the banking sector, sovereign debt went into default. 
 One important factor determining the ultimate outcome may be an interaction 
between the nature of the debt contracts in place and the robustness of the financial 
system. Our framework for thinking about financial crises is very much parallel to 
that enunciated in Mishkin (2003) which in turn is inspired by an open-economy 




sheets, net worth and informational asymmetries are key ingredients in this type of a 
model. 
Initial trouble might begin in the banking sector for a number of reasons. One 
possibility is that international interest rates rise. This worsens the balance sheets of 
non-financial firms and banks alike. As the number of non-performing loans rises and 
net worth falls, a decline in lending can occur contributing further to output losses. At 
this point, internationally mobile capital may take a decidedly pessimistic view of 
returns in the debtor country and either stop coming in (a sudden stop) or reverse 
itself leaving significant short-term financing gaps. 
This reversal leads to more trouble in the financial sector and increased stress 
for non-financial firms which are forced to cut investment because of the lack of 
financing. Governments may have trouble making interest payments on debt coming 
due as capital markets become unwilling to continue rolling debt over. The capital 
flow reversal, if large enough, could also force the abandonment of an exchange rate 
peg and a large change in the nominal exchange rate. Floating regimes could also see 
large depreciation occur under such a scenario. 
A view inspired by the events of the late 1990s regarding the impact of such 
exchange rate changes is that they may be contractionary.
2 This is where original sin 
enters the picture. The majority of obligations for nearly all countries are in foreign 
currency or, in the late nineteenth century they may have also been denominated in 
terms of a fixed amount of gold or payable at a fixed exchange rate. Depreciation vis-
à-vis creditor countries or breaking the link between gold and the domestic currency 
could lead to an increase in the real value of debt. This is a redistribution of wealth 
from domestic borrowers to their creditors who are expecting a certain amount of gold 
or foreign currency.
3 When net worth matters for lending decisions, this decline in the 
net worth of  debtors can lead to another round of “disintermediation” causing 
widespread bankruptcies due to liquidity problems. All else equal, the deterioration to 
debtors’ balance sheets would be more severe the greater the amount of fixed interest 
rate hard currency debt outstanding.  
                                                            
2 Theoretical work by Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2004) demonstrates how under certain plausible 
circumstances original sin can lead to contractionary depreciations. Their theoretical model divides 
countries into a financially robust region and a financially vulnerable region. The latter experience 
contractionary depreciations. 
3 Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003) argue that what matters is the aggregate external 
mismatch and if all debt is domestic, that one sector’s losses are the others’ gains. Our view however is 
that net worth matters. When a debtor’s net worth deteriorates, borrowing capacity falls, and the capital 
markets seize up. This is one reason why we should focus on domestic and external hard currency debt 







 2.1 The Role of Original Sin 
 
  It has been the case since at least the 18
th century that debt issued on 
international capital markets has been denominated in the currency of the market of 
issue and not the currency of the issuing country. A large amount of domestically 
issued debt was payable in a fixed amount of gold or at a fixed exchange rate. 
Similarly in the recent past, debt issued on international markets, and even a 
significant proportion of domestic issues, are made payable in foreign currencies or at 
a fixed exchange rate. It has also long been noted that such debt can become more 
onerous to repay in the face of depreciations, and that since emerging markets often 
face rapid exchange rate depreciations associated with sudden stops and reversals of 
capital inflows, loose monetary policy, or terms of trade shocks these countries are the 
victims of such a volatile combination.  
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1997) argued that the danger of exchange rate 
fluctuations in the face of foreign currency borrowing might oblige many countries to 
adopt hard currency pegs. They coined the term “original sin” because they argued 
foreign currency denominated debt was imposed by international capital markets. 
Nations with poor reputations, and even nations with ostensibly good reputations or 
solid fundamentals, are obliged to issue debt in key international currencies. In other 
words, domestic policies or problems were not the only reason countries could not 
borrow in their own currencies.  
  One key controversy remains. Exactly how harmful is original sin? Work by 
Eichengreen and Hausmann with Ugo Panizza (Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza 
2005) has shown that countries with higher original sin have higher exchange rate 
volatility and higher macroeconomic volatility. Marc Flandreau (2003) argues that in 
the nineteenth century depreciation increased the debt burden because of original sin 
which led to sovereign debt crises. He illustrates this with reference to several cases. 
But we are unaware of any work which has attempted to find a systematic empirical 
association between original sin and financial crises either in the past or for the period 
between 1972 and 1997.
4  
                                                            
4 Our conclusions differ from Flandreau’s as we take on a wider set of hypotheses and cases. Empirical 
work by Flandreau and Zúmer (2004) which regresses sovereign bond yields on a ratio of interest 




For the historical period, we collected data from various national sources on 
hard currency debt and augmented and compared this with data made available by 
Flandreau and Zúmer (2004). What we refer to as hard currency debt is government 
debt that carried a gold clause or was made payable at a fixed rate in a foreign 
currency.
5 Our measure of original sin is the ratio of this quantity to total public debt 
outstanding.  
This measure is different from the measure we use for the 1972-1997 period. 
For this period we use the measure of original sin defined in Eichengreen, Hausmann, 
and Panizza (2005). This measure of international original sin for country i based on 
securities issued by residents and non-residents internationally is 
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We must be clear that there is a severe limitation in the contemporary original 
sin data.  Data is only available for the years 1993 to 1997. We calculate the within 
country average of the observations available. We then use this average value for all 
the years in which a country appears in the data set. This broadens the time span of 
our sample but obviously creates some measurement error in our key explanatory 
variable and obviates any “within” style regressions. We are confident that the bias 
imparted is not too severe. This relies on the fact that original sin is extremely slow to 
move over time and for most countries it does not move at all over the observation 
period.
 6  
One key difference between our nineteenth century measure and the 
contemporary measure that we use is that in the historical period we look at 
                                                                                                                                                                      
debt was dangerous. Their tests are quite different from ours since our dependent variables are debt 
crises, banking crises, or currency crises. Frankel and Rose (1996) examined “currency crashes,” 
external debt and exchange rate fluctuations, but their approach to measuring original sin, its impact 
and the type of crises considered is also different than ours. Specifically, they look at the transmission 
of shocks from the core through the interest rate on foreign currency debt. 
5 The data appendix from Bordo and Meissner (forthcoming) has more to say about the structure of this 
debt. Flandreau and Zúmer (2004) highlight just some of the difficulties in defining this type of debt. 
Italian bonds for example had de facto gold clauses for foreigners but not for residents, but de jure gold 
clauses for both classes of creditors for a certain proportion of the debt. Likewise, Spain arbitrarily 
implemented a residency distinction for manner of repayment around 1900. US debt was sometimes 
vague ex ante about the terms of repayment and often repayment was promised “in specie”. Mostly this 
was meant to be gold but could have meant silver which secularly depreciated against gold after 1873. 
Still our measure is at least a good proxy for the variable of interest. 
6 Australia, Canada and South Africa saw large declines in their original sin measures over the 1980s. 
Because of this we understate their measures in the 1970s. In the econometrics this is likely to lead to 
slight upward bias of the positive effect of original sin on crisis incidence since these countries had few 





government debt issued in domestic and international markets instead of looking only 
at international issues. The data from the latter period leaves out domestically issued 
debt.  
One reason we collected the domestic data in the early period is because many 
domestic issues of the day carried gold clauses. As described above, in the case where 
monetary authorities devalued the local currency in terms of gold this would have an 
effect similar to a depreciation when a country had foreign currency debt. In either 
event, real debt repayments for local currency gold clause debt and for foreign 
currency debt would both increase.
7 Hence, in the early period we do not classify debt 
as “debt issued in (local) currency i" if it contained a “gold clause” stipulating a fixed 
quantity of gold per unit of local currency payable. Only debt payable in local paper 
currency, without mention of the gold-local currency exchange rate upon payment of 
coupons and principal, is included in the ratio above.  
The question then arises of how related our measures are in the two periods, 
and this hinges on how domestic original sin relates to international original sin. 
Unfortunately, at the time of writing, there is not much data readily available to 
answer this question. Eichengreen, Hausman and Panizza (2003) collected this data 
for two dozen countries for a limited number of years and showed that in several of 
these, domestic original sin diverges distinctly from the level of original sin. But for 
the most part, original sin and domestic original sin are highly correlated and so we 
are comfortable using the international measure.
8 
  Figure 1 shows the averages of the original sin measure between 1880 and 
1913. This reveals a counterintuitive ranking. Many countries with poor fiscal history, 
a shaky exchange rate policy and economic backwardness have low original sin. 
However, this is consistent with previous findings by Flandreau and Sussman (2005) 
and Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2005). Financial centers have less original 
sin. Small peripheral countries have a lot of original sin. Countries with ostensibly 
rotten fiscal institutions and poor international track records have intermediate levels 
of original sin. Notice that Spain, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy and Argentina are all 
towards the lower middle of the spectrum.
9 
                                                            
7 We assume here that nominal depreciations are equivalent to real depreciations.  
8 The share of each kind of debt (domestic and external issues) will also obviously matter. This could 
be one reason why we find below that more developed countries with larger pools of domestic savings 
and larger domestic debt markets are able to deal with measures of original sin that are quite high.  
9 In Bordo, Meissner and Redish (2005) and Bordo and Meissner (forthcoming) we discuss the 




  Figure 2 displays the within country averages of original sin for the 1993 to 
1997 period. Again, a counter-intuitive ranking comes forth if one believes that poor 
financial development and a lack of credibility matter for original sin. Amongst the 
countries with measures of original sin between 0.8 and 1, we see highly developed 
countries such as Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Singapore and Sweden. At the same 
time, nearly all emerging markets except perhaps South Africa also have high levels 
of original sin. Figures 1 and 2 then provoke the question: are fundamentals (both 
those directly observable and those that are less easy to systematically operationalize) 
more important for explaining crisis incidence than the actual level of hard currency 
debt or original sin?  
 
2.2 Currency Mismatches   
 
  Goldstein and Turner (2004) responded to this fundamental question 
by arguing that currency “mismatches” are the main potential problem with foreign 
currency debt. Countries that have foreign currency liabilities which are not offset by 
foreign currency assets may be more likely than countries with more foreign assets to 
find it difficult to repay their foreign currency debts in the event of a depreciation The 
way we choose to measure mismatch is different from Goldstein and Turner and 
slightly closer to that used in Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003).
10 For 
country i  we have 
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For the nineteenth century, our measure of reserves usually only includes gold 
reserves held at the central bank, in the banking system or held by the government 
treasury. The sources are listed in the appendix to Bordo and Meissner (forthcoming). 
For the twentieth century we use international reserves as given in data underlying 
Bordo et. al. (2001). 
 For the twentieth century, we use the total of external debt given in the World 
Bank’s Global Development Finance or the level of external debt given by the IMF’s 
                                                            
10 Eichengreen Hausmann and Panizza (2003) report that the correlation between their measure of 





International Financial Statistics for countries not listed in the former. For the 
nineteenth century, total hard currency debt (domestic and international issues) is 
calculated directly if the data is available or by multiplying the total debt outstanding 
by the percentage of total debt that is payable in gold or foreign currencies. Our 
expectation is that a higher mismatch measure should be correlated with more 
financial crises. Nevertheless, our measure does leave out a significant fraction of 
total assets and liabilities in the economy. The median of our twentieth century 
mismatch measure is 0.95 with a standard deviation of 1.3. In the nineteenth century 
the values are 0.79 and 2.66. 
 
 
2.3 Debt Intolerance 
    
Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) have coined the term debt intolerance 
to describe why emerging market countries run into debt problems even with low debt 
to GDP ratios. Their evidence suggests that past defaults generate poor sovereign 
ratings. These countries face much higher borrowing costs at a given level of debt to 
GDP. There is a running dispute as to whether original sin is simply a manifestation 
of such problems.  
  Accordingly we include a measure of default history in our empirical models. 
For the nineteenth century sample, we interact a public debt to government revenue 
ratio with an indicator variable that equals one if a country had at least one default 
episode between 1800 and 1880. In the twentieth century sample our debt 
sustainability measure changes to the debt to output ratio since output data is more 
reliable and our debt measures include more than just government debt. We interact 
this ratio with an indicator that equals one if there was a default in the country 
between 1800 and 1971. If the increase in the probability of a financial crisis for a 
marginal increase in the debt to revenue or debt to GDP ratio is larger for a peripheral 
country or a past defaulter, we would argue there is evidence in support of the debt 
intolerance hypothesis. 
 





The literature on predicting financial crises with econometric techniques is 
abundant.
11 Our approach is inspired by the pared down methodology of Frankel and 
Rose (1996) who looked at currency crashes at the annual level. Glick and Hutchinson 
(2001) explore twin crises in emerging markets, and our methodology to gauge the 
interaction between banking, currency and debt crises in part resembles theirs.  
We attempt to control for as many important macro-economic fundamentals as 
possible while still maintaining some comparability over time. The list includes (with 
controls for the later period in parentheses) total outstanding government debt divided 
by government revenue (debt to GDP), growth in the terms of trade, the trade balance 
divided by nominal GDP, the domestic long-term interest rate, an indicator for 
whether the country maintained a gold standard (or a pegged exchange rate), growth 
of the money supply, the ratio of gold reserves in the banking system to notes in 
circulation (the ratio of reserves to M2), and the yield on British long-term bonds (the 
unweighted average of G7 long-term interest rates). Our sources, and definitions of 
these variables are located in the data appendix, in Bordo and Meissner (forthcoming) 
and the NBER working paper version of this paper. 
  A complete list of the included countries for the basic specifications is also 
found in the data appendix. The specifications from the 1880-1913 sample include 
roughly 21 countries which were also examined in Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, 
and Martínez-Peria (2001). We have added information on crises and macro data for 
nine other countries. These new additions include Austria-Hungary, Egypt, India, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, and Uruguay. However 
limitations in availability of the macro data prevent all of these countries from 
appearing in each and every specification. For the 1972-1997 sample, the number of 
countries that actually appear in the estimations numbers roughly 36 countries in the 
typical econometric model. 
 
2.5 Crises, 1880-1913 
 
                                                            




In Figure 3 we present the frequency of various types of crises (banking, 
currency, twin, debt, “third generation” crises and all types of crisis together).
12 This 
is the number of years a country was in crisis divided by total possible years of 
observation. We use the country-year as the unit of observation and eliminate all 
country-years that witness ongoing crises from the denominator (except for third 
generation crises where we do not eliminate ongoing banking and currency crises) to 
come up with a total number for years of observation. We see the pattern found in 
Bordo et. al. (2001) in terms of the relative frequency of types of crises. The 
predominant form of crises before 1914 was banking crises, followed by currency 
crises, twin and then debt crises.
13 By comparison, the most recent period seems much 
more crisis prone. Today the incidence of currency crises is quite high and debt crises 
accompanied by banking and/or currency crises are much more frequent although still 
quite uncommon overall.  
Figures 4 and 5 present scatter plots of the percentage of the sample period a 
country was in a crisis episode versus our measure of original sin. In the pre-World 
War I era, there appears to be an inverse U relationship between debt crises and 
original sin. Countries with intermediate ranges of original sin seem to take longer to 
resolve their debt crises than those at either end of the spectrum. No such pattern is 
evident in the latest period. In fact there appears to be a direct positive relationship 
between the severity of debt crises and the average level of original sin and similarly 
for currency and banking crises. But still there is a much larger variance in experience 
at the upper levels of original sin. 
 
 
3. Statistical Findings 
 
Our statistical approach uses pooled probit specifications.
14The dependent 
variable is the first year of a debt crisis, currency crisis, or banking crisis. Our data set 
is an unbalanced panel, and the observational unit is the country year. We omit 
                                                            
12 Our crisis dates and the methodology we use to classify years of crisis are listed in the appendix. We 
define a crisis as “third generation” if there was a debt crisis accompanied by either a banking crisis 
(ongoing or in the first year) a currency crisis or both in the same or previous year. 
13 Debt crises were not demarcated by Bordo et al. (2001) 
14 Endogeneity of the regressors as well as usual specification problems may be present. We attempted 
to mitigate endogeneity biases in un-reported specifications by using lagged values of the explanatory 
variables. Results in these cases did not change drastically in qualitative terms. Of course this solution 
is only valid if variables are not too persistent. Also, using lags creates measurement error issues which 




country years that include ongoing crises. Throughout, we control for the lack of 
statistical independence between intra-country observations by using 
heteroscedasticity robust, country clustered standard errors.
15 We first present 
specifications with as many variables as is feasible. Finally after using pooled probits 
we move to linear probability models with country fixed effects to control for time 
invariant unobservable variables that could cause spurious inference in the pooled 
probit models. 
Our basic finding is that currency mismatches are a much more robust 
determinant of financial crises than original sin, although original sin by itself does 
contribute to crises. Mismatch enters as a direct determinant, and along the lines of 
the framework sketched above, there is some evidence that currency mismatches also 
contribute to debt crises indirectly. This is because mismatches are often at the root of 
banking and currency crises which themselves are statistically significant 
determinants of  debt problems. Moreover, in avoiding debt crises and financial 
meltdowns there seems to be an important role for the level of financial and economic 
development and other hard to measure factors.  
 
 
2.1 Debt Crises 
 
 
  Tables 1 and 2 present results from several specifications. The initial year of a 
debt crisis is the dependent variable. Table 1 is for the 1880 to 1913 sample and Table 
2 is for the 1972-1997 sample.  
Column one of Table 1 presents a comprehensive specification that includes a 
variable set as large as possible and which also allows for controls for original sin and 
currency mismatches. We see that there is an inverse U shaped pattern in original sin 
and in mismatches.
16 There is also evidence of debt intolerance. These variables are 
statistically significant (at better than the 90 percent level of confidence) at the means 
                                                            
15 We estimated, but do not report, random effects probit models as well but found them to perform 
weakly as they are known to do when the number of explanatory variables is large relative to the 
sample size.  
16 The reason we allow for squared terms is twofold: first, scatter plots suggested there might be such a 
relationship; second, including a simple linear term yields a coefficient on original sin that is negative 
and statistically insignificant. The latter result contradicts the basic theoretical proposition in the 
literature, but could also arise due to omitted variables biases which we discuss below. The squared 




for each of these controls.
17 Figure 6 illustrates the marginal effect of original sin for 
various values together with two standard error confidence bands.  
The size of the estimated coefficients on the hard currency debt ratios are also 
economically significant. Figure 7 presents the predicted probabilities of a debt crisis 
for various values of the ratio of hard currency debt to total debt. We hold all controls 
at their mean except the currency crisis indicator and the lagged banking crisis 
indicator which take on the value one or zero. Here one can easily see the economic 
significance of this measure of original sin especially in the range of original sin equal 
to 50 percent where the predicted probability of having a debt crisis peaks. One also 
can appreciate the interaction between banking crises, currency crises and debt crises. 
At an original sin level of 50 percent, having a banking crisis in the previous year and 
a currency crisis in the same year increases the predicted probability of a debt crisis 
by over 10 times from 0.023 to 0.25. Column 2 pares down the specification dropping 
the controls for mismatch to see if multicollinearity between mismatch and original 
sin is a problem. We still see a similar quadratic form. Column 3 leaves out original 
sin and leaves in the mismatch variables. Mismatch itself does not appear to be a 
statistically significant direct determinant of debt crises in the nineteenth century.
18 
We explore possible interpretations of the inverse U pattern below. 
Most other variables have signs that fit our priors: more gold reserves relative 
to notes outstanding, a larger trade surplus to GDP ratio, not being on the gold 
standard, a lower long-term interest rate, and a calm international environment in 
capital markets, as measured by the interest rate on British consols, are all associated 
with lower probabilities of debt crises. The statistical significance of the coefficients 
on these variables varies however.
19 There is also evidence, as we have seen, that 
currency crises and banking crises are positively associated with the outbreak of a 
debt default. This is some support for the balance sheet view of crises discussed 
above. 
                                                            
17 The statistical significance of the interaction effects and polynomial terms must be approached with 
caution. We are interested in the statistical significance of the partial derivative of the probability with 
respect to say hard currency debt at various values. We do not report the statistical significance of such 
an effect for the debt intolerance interactions or for the interactions of variables with GDP. We do 
however present simulated confidence bands and the mean partial effect of original sin arising from the 
quadratic in original sin in figures below. These were calculated using code made available by William 
Clark at http://homepages.nyu.edu/%7emrg217/interaction.html.  
18 This is true even if we exclude the squared mismatch term. 
19 Perhaps the positive coefficient on the gold standard variable is compatible with theories that argue 
that rigid exchange rate policies amplify negative external shocks more than flexible rates. But since 
the statistical significance varies a lot by specification, we do not see overwhelming evidence for any 
hypothesis suggesting a positive or negative coefficient here. Multicollinearity between this variable 
and the reserves variable could matter here too. See Edwards (2003) for a wide-ranging discussion of 




We also provide a measure of the fit of the model. This is gauged by the 
percentage of actual crises that were predicted to be crisis episodes, and the 
percentage of non-crisis years that are predicted to be non-crisis years. We use a 
predicted probability of greater than 0.1 to classify a country as having a debt crisis. 
This is a low threshold, but debt crises are relatively rare in the raw sample. The 
sample frequency is 0.01. For the debt crises, the type I errors are fairly small and the 
type II errors are mainly concentrated in the country years immediately preceding or 
coming after actual crises.
20 
Table 2 presents the results of similar specifications for debt crises for the 
1972-1997 period. Column 1 shows that there is a positive but statistically 
insignificant relationship between our measure of original sin and debt crises. In 
column 1 there is also no sign of mismatch being a statistically significant 
determinant of debt crises and no evidence of debt intolerance. Similar to the 
nineteenth century, we do see a positive and statistically significant association 
between currency crises and debt crises. Having a currency crisis raises the 
probability of having a debt crisis by over 5 percentage points. The point estimates on 
contemporary and lagged values of banking crises are positive but not statistically 
significant.  
To take the strain off the sample with so many explanatory variables, we pare 
down the specification in column 2 and find that original sin has a positive impact on 
the likelihood of a crisis, and it is now close to being statistically significant at 
standard levels of confidence. Column 4 eliminates the original sin measure and 
reinstates the mismatch measure to see if collinearity might have been the reason for 
the low precision in column 1. Indeed in column 4 we see that mismatches increase 
the susceptibility to debt crises and the marginal effect is statistically significant at 
very high levels of confidence. A one point increase in the mismatch ratio (equivalent 
to one standard deviation) would imply that the probability of a debt crisis increases 
by 0.02.  
Column 3 introduces the logarithm of GDP per capita and its square as a 
control variable.
21 This allows us to show how GDP per capita interacts with original 
                                                            
20 We use the 0.1 barrier for currency and banking crises. Our maximum predicted probabilities rarely 
exceed 0.2 for any type of crisis. 
21 We tried simply interacting original sin with GDP per capita but the results seemed counterintuitive. 
We do not report this specification even though we cannot rule out such a specification for any other 
reason. We found the marginal effect of original sin was negative and approached zero for higher levels 
of GDP per capita. On the other hand the marginal effect of GDP per capita was negative and 




sin to affect crisis outcomes. When we do this we see that middle income countries, 
roughly where the emerging markets would be located, are the most likely to have a 
crisis when other control variables are held constant. Figure 8 shows this by 
presenting the predicted probability of a crisis for various levels of per capita output 
holding original sin at 1 (its maximum and also the modal value). We also compare 
those probabilities when the currency crisis indicator is one and zero so as to show, 
yet again, that at any level of output per capita currency crises and debt crises are 
likely to come together when original sin is high. It should be noted that the hump 
shaped pattern does not disappear whether we include or exclude the mismatch 
position.  We return to this finding below in our discussion and conclusions. 
 
3.2 Currency Crises 
 
Table 3 presents results of specifications where the dependent variable is the 
probability of having a currency crisis between 1880 and 1913.
22 There are 17 events 
to be predicted in this sample. None of the variables are statistically significant at 
standard levels of confidence except for the gold cover ratio. Endogeneity is a worry 
here since quite obviously this variable would be much lower in the midst of an attack 
on a currency.  
In terms of marginal effects, we still see a quadratic in original sin in column 2 
and a positive relationship between the mismatch variable in column 3. Some 
marginal effects of the other variables have the expected signs while others do not. 
However, nothing in column 2 or 3 is statistically significant except for the trade 
balance to GDP which has a positive sign as it did in the Frankel and Rose (1996) 
study of the late twentieth century.
23 Lagging this variable causes the magnitude of 
the coefficient and its statistical significance to fall also suggesting some endogeneity 
problems. 
The positive coefficient on the mismatch variable suggests that original sin is 
dangerous, but that countries that have original sin may be able to avoid currency 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and its square. The marginal effects were consistent with the idea that original sin’s marginal impact is 
largest at intermediate levels of per capita GDP. 
22 The exchange rate enters our original sin and debt variables. We note that our results here are similar 
in qualitative terms when we use one or two lags of mismatch, hard currency to total debt and the debt 
to revenue ratio. 
23 The marginal effect of changes in the current account in their paper was statistically insignificant. 
The seemingly counter-intuitive result that net exporters have a higher chance of a crisis seems to arise 
from the fact that the small peripheral countries in our sample tend to be net exporters while GB, 




crises if they manage to collect adequate reserves or are sufficiently open. Since the 
outbreak of a debt crisis seems to be associated with currency crises (see Table 1), this 
is limited evidence that poorly managed original sin is indirectly associated with 
currency crises. 
In Table 4 we present specifications that try to explain currency crises between 
1972 and 1997. Contrary to the finding of the nineteenth century, there is evidence 
that more original sin leads to a higher chance of a currency crisis, but this is only 
when we do not control for the mismatch position. Mismatches however are 
associated with currency crises both controlling for original sin (column 1) and not 
controlling for original sin (column 3). This result is again highly suggestive that 
proper management of original sin can help alleviate currency crises. Since currency 
crises were seen to be a determinant of debt crises, low mismatch has the indirect 
effect of helping avoid debt crises too. 
The current account is negatively related to currency crises (as is intuitive). 
Increases in long-term interest rates lead to more crises as do rapid increases in the 
money supply. There is some weak evidence that a banking crisis in the previous year 
is associated with a currency crisis (p-value 0.16).  Overall the models in the 
nineteenth century fit poorly as judged by the high Type I errors while the models of 
the twentieth century make far fewer of such errors. The opposite is true of type II 
errors. In the latter sample, far too many currency crises are predicted to occur when 
in fact no currency crisis does occur.  
  
3.3 Banking Crises 
  
  Tables 5 and 6 show that there is some evidence that banking crises are 
associated with original sin and currency mismatches. Between 1880 and 1913, we 
see a quadratic or inverse U impact of hard currency debt as we did with debt crises in 
the earlier period. However we cannot reject the hypothesis that the entire marginal 
effect is zero at standard levels of confidence. Between 1972 and 1997 we see that the 
impact of more original sin is higher in low and middle income countries than in high 
income countries. There is also evidence of a straightforward positive link between 
mismatch and banking crises in the twentieth century. 
 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 re-run the basic specification of column 1 to see if 




turns out the coefficients are not much different from column 1 and their statistical 
significance does not change dramatically in either specification.
24 In terms of fit, all 
of the models seem nearly equivalent by the log likelihood values. Only about 20 
percent of actual sample crises are predicted reliably. Most of the other controls have 
the expected signs but are not statistically significant except the trade surplus to GDP 
ratio. We do see positive marginal effects on the currency crisis indicators but neither 
of them are statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Table 6 turns to the late twentieth century. In column 1 we see results similar 
to the debt crisis specifications for the same period in Table 2. Original sin and 
mismatch are positively related to crises, but the coefficients are  both statistically 
indistinguishable from zero when both variables are included. Column 2 demonstrates 
that the coefficient on original sin is not likely to be statistically indistinguishable 
from zero simply because of collinearity with the mismatch control. In column 3 we 
interact the logarithm of GDP per capita with original sin. A marginal increase in 
original sin has a smaller positive impact on banking crises at higher levels of GDP 
per capita. The predicted probability drops by more than one third when moving from 
a per capita income level of slightly less than $3,000 (e.g. Mexico, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Brazil in 1995) to an income level matching the average of Austria, Canada, 
Denmark, or the US of roughly $22,000.
25  
Finally column 4 shows that the marginal effect of a mismatch is positive and 
statistically significant. A one point increase in the mismatch variable would lead to a 
substantive increase in the predicted probability of a banking crisis of roughly 0.02 
percentage points.  
The other controls that are statistically significant are the growth of the money 
supply (positive coefficient), the trade surplus to GDP ratio (negative) and the long-
term interest rate (positive). We find negative point estimates for the marginal effects 
of currency crises and lagged currency crises, but these are not close to being 
statistically significant.  
Overall the results suggest that original sin itself is not incontrovertibly an 
important determinant of banking crises. However, hard currency debt that results in a 
mismatch seems to be associated with a higher chance of having a crisis.  Countries 
                                                            
24 One possibility why mismatch is not significant here, while it seems to be in the twentieth century, is 
that the measure here relates only to public debt and borrowing. In the twentieth century sample the 
measure includes both public and private borrowing. As we shall show below, controlling for such 
heterogeneity shows mismatch is positively correlated to banking crises in the nineteenth century. 




with a higher GDP per capita, may also have the capacity to make original sin less 
dangerous.  
 
3.4 Sensitivity Analysis: Omitted Variables and Heterogeneity  
 
  In our nineteenth century sample we found some evidence that after a certain 
point more hard currency debt relative to the total seemed to be associated with fewer 
debt crises and banking crises. In the late twentieth century, we also see some 
evidence that original sin interacts in a complex way with GDP per capita. These 
findings could be due to a simple econometric specification problem. Namely our 
original sin variables could be correlated with unobservables or omitted observables. 
This could be the case if those countries most at risk of a crisis took care to protect 
their financial systems or had developed more effective ways of dealing with crises 
despite their high levels of original sin.
26 If these factors were time invariant, an 
econometric solution to such a problem is to include country-level indicator variables 
or “fixed effects”. 
Since this is infeasible to do in a limited dependent variable model with our 
particular data configuration, we move to a country “fixed effects” linear probability 
model. Table 7 re-specifies the baseline models of debt, currency and banking crises 
for the early period in this way.  Like the previous results, the models fit fairly poorly 
since there are so few crises compared to non-crisis years. Many of the coefficients on 
the basic macro controls are statistically insignificant.  
Nevertheless, we find the same quadratic in original sin for debt and banking 
crises that we found above, but it is not statistically significant. We take away three 
lessons from column 1 and column 3. The fact that the quadratic shape (i.e., the point 
estimates on original sin and its square are positive and negative respectively) does 
not disappear suggests that it is unlikely to be time invariant unobservables which are 
                                                            
26 The endogeneity of the level of original sin should be explored and other experiences across time 
should be compared. The endogeneity bias would appear to be small. Eichengreen, Hausmann and 
Panizza (2003, 2005), and Flandreau and Sussman (2005) take the view that original sin is inversely 
related to country size. Having a financial center also decreases original sin. Being large and/or having 
a financial center makes for liquid markets in the domestic currency and increases the demand for such 
assets in the portfolio of international investors. Because of this, “endogeneity” may be less of an issue 
than one might conjecture at the outset. Evidence from Australia, New Zealand and the US in Bordo, 
Meissner and Redish (2005) suggests that wars and large shocks that closed international markets and 
forced governments into the domestic markets catalyzed the process. Still other factors are obviously 




causing the inverse U. If it were simply a case of omitted time invariant variables we 
would have expected the inclusion of fixed effects to reveal a statistically significant 
and positive relationship between original sin and crises, and (unreported regressions) 
excluding the square term does not reveal such a pattern. At the same time, there are 
two other possible interpretations of column 1 and column 3. One is that since 
original sin moves relatively slowly over time the fixed effects would naturally be 
unable to estimate the impact of original sin on crises. But equally we could also 
conclude that hard currency debt is not associated with debt or banking crises once 
proper controls are included. Only more clever identification strategies or more data 
will be able confirm which one of these assertions is correct. 
If one accepts the  point estimates on original sin in column 1 and 3 of Table 
7, then it is impossible to argue that empire status, resource endowments or better 
institutions explain how places like the US, Canada, Australia and Scandinavia 
managed to carry high original sin and also avoid severe financial crises. We believe 
this is because they all had strong and flexible financial systems that could avert total 
crisis in times of stress, good fiscal institutions, and borrowed largely for productive 
investments. We also reject the notion that credible adherence to the gold standard 
was decisive here. This seems to us an ex post justification. We recall that nations 
often revoked convertibility (e.g. the dollar was inconvertible from 1861 to 1879, pro-
silver forces were close enough to victory to matter until 1896, and the franc was 
inconvertible between 1871 and 1878). Moreover, if a credible commitment to gold 
was the main similarity between this group and the European Core, debt contracts 
should not have been any different from those in France, Great Britain and Germany 
where there was never an exchange rate or gold clause. Instead, this group of 
countries always had gold clauses, fixed exchange rate clauses in its debt or else its 
debt was payable directly in sterling. It is crucial to emphasize that financial markets 
treated these countries differently ex ante from the leading financial centers.  
There is also little evidence that in the nineteenth century a smaller mismatch 
directly helped avoid debt crises. This also suggests the possibility that these original 
sin “survivors” had a more active approach to managing crises or their financial 
systems evolved dynamically in a way that helped stave off financial meltdown 
following major shocks. Oppositely there is little evidence that places like Argentina, 




invariant characteristics such as “bad government” or institutions or simply because 
they were in the geographic or economic periphery.
27 
Table 7 also reveals a striking chain of association that is readily consistent 
with the third generation crisis framework outlined above. Column 3 shows 
mismatches are associated with banking crises. These in turn are associated with the 
advent of a currency crisis. Column 1 then reveals that both banking and currency 
crises are associated with debt crises.  So while the direct impact of hard currency 
debt on debt crises is absent in terms of statistical significant in Table 7, an indirect 
effect along the lines of third generation crises is clearly evident here.  Again, this 
suggests that good debt management and avoidance of mismatches are at the root of 
preventing financial meltdown.  
  We also estimate a fixed effects linear probability model for the 1972-1997 
period and report these results in Table 8. Given that our original sin variable is time 
invariant by construction, we are unable to control for it. But we can control for 
mismatch. The key determinants of debt crises seem to be the debt output ratio, 
interest rates and also the existence of a currency crisis. Most of the other coefficients 
are not statistically significant.  
Like in the early sample we observe an indirect connection between 
mismatches and debt crises in this sample. The chain of logic points to the following 
conclusion. Better borrowing safeguards in the form of lower mismatches could stem 
the explosion of a currency crisis. Since contemporary and lagged currency crises 
appear to be strongly associated with debt crises in column 1 of Table 8 it is likely 
that smaller mismatches can limit exposure to debt crises. 
The evidence from controlling for unobservables and country-specific 
heterogeneity provides very mixed evidence (at best) for the idea that original sin 
itself is the culprit for major financial meltdowns. On the other hand mismatch 
matters. Lower mismatches seem to be associated in both periods with fewer 
outbreaks of currency or banking crises. Stemming these types of crises by avoiding 
                                                            
27 In other un-reported specifications, we left out fixed effects and tried using proxies for good 
institutions and financial development in our probit models. We included the ratio of the money stock 
to GDP, a British Empire indicator, a central bank indicator and a branch banking indicator. None of 
these variables eliminated the quadratic pattern or gave rise to a conditionally positive relationship 
between original sin and debt crises, currency crises or banking crises. In the debt crisis specifications, 
it is not feasible to estimate the equations with an empire dummy simply because no included 
dominion, colony or other member of the British Commonwealth ever had a debt default in this period. 
This indicator would be a perfect predictor of not having a debt crisis. So we are left clinging to the 
notion that the countries with lots of original sin like the US Canada, Australia and New Zealand and 
perhaps the Scandinavian countries were different along other dimensions than those captured by these 
proxy variables. Caballero, Cowan and Kearns (2005) talk about currency-trust and country-trust which 




mismatches could mean the difference in avoiding the onset of a debt default or a total 
financial meltdown. The presence of original sin makes implementing safeguards 
important. Reserve accumulation and/or openness to exports seem to be viable 
strategies to avoid troubling currency and banking runs which in turn could limit the 
likelihood of a debt crisis outcome.  
 
 
4. Discussion: Some Countries do not suffer from crises despite having original sin.  
 
Our results above suggest an inverse U association between debt crises and 
original sin. More original sin is associated with a higher likelihood of a debt crisis up 
to a point, and then observations with levels of original sin greater than 50 to 60 
percent face a lower likelihood of a crisis. The inverse U relationship suggests a 
division of the countries in the nineteenth century sample into three groups. The first 
group includes the financial centers of Europe with low or no original sin and few 
crises. The second group includes the periphery countries of the Latin American cone 
and the Mediterranean region of Europe with their episodes of fiscal profligacy 
(Greece and Portugal) and periods of instability in their banking systems (e.g., 
Argentina with its new banking laws of the 1880s and Italy prior to the financial 
sector restructuring that took place in the 1890s).
28 Countries in the third group 
possessed stable institutions, but also strong and flexible financial systems usually 
able to cope with crises as they emerged (e.g., the US, Japan, Denmark, and Sweden) 
or intricate correspondent banking relationships and colonial ties (e.g., Australia, 
Canada, and New Zealand).  
In Figure 8 we see a hump in predicted probabilities where the countries with 
mid-level GDP per capita have the highest probabilities of a financial crisis. This also 
leads us to suggest that countries today can be broken into three categories when 
original sin is high. First, we have the poorest countries of the world (e.g., Colombia, 
Nigeria, and Pakistan) which, despite suffering from original sin, rely relatively little 
on external finance. Next, the middle income emerging markets (e.g., Argentina, 
Brazil, Korea, Mexico, and Taiwan) which rely on external financing are the ones 
most at risk of seeing their hard currency liabilities interact with currency crashes 
leading to a debt default episode. Then, there are the highly developed countries (e.g., 
                                                            
28 See the capsule histories of these crisis episodes included in Bordo et. al. (2001) for a brief summary 
and further reading. Bordo and Meissner (forthcoming) also report in more detail the experiences of the 




Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Spain, and Sweden) which also suffer from 
high liability dollarization. Nevertheless, either external financing is less significant or 
they have the capability to deal with shocks to the financial system in ways we have 
not controlled for and hence to avoid crises. Finally countries with low original sin 
and high development are placed in a fourth category. 
We schematically illustrate this four part categorization in Figure 9. Here the 
“radar” graph plots variables of interest on each radiating axis and the lines 
connecting the particular values represent the different groups of countries. We 
divided countries into four groups based on GDP per capita and levels of original sin. 
The first are those with GDP per capita lower than $2,900 where the average level of 
original sin between 1993 and 1997 was 0.99 percent. The second are those with GDP 
per capita between $2,900 and $8,100 with an average value of average original sin 
equal to 0.76, and finally two groups with GDP above $8,100 one with an original sin 
level greater than 20 percent and also one with less than 20 percent. Next we chose 
variables of interest such as the average trade deficit within each group, the average 
time spent without final resolution of a debt crisis, the average predicted probability 
of a debt crisis (based on the model in column 3 of table 2) and the median predicted 
probability based on the same model, and our mismatch variable.  
The richest countries are lower on all five dimensions. The middle income, 
emerging markets are highest on these dimensions except for the average predicted 
probability of having a debt crisis.
29 Trade deficits are twice as high on average in 
these countries, and they have a median predicted probability twice as high as the less 
developed countries. It would also appear that many of the world’s richest countries 
have significant original sin and still have a low chance of a debt crisis. Moreover the 
figure shows that rich countries with high original sin and low crisis frequency run 
bigger trade surpluses or lower deficits and also control their mismatch positions 






                                                            
29 This measure is sensitive to the GDP cutoff point. If we lower it slightly then we include a few more 
countries like Chile and Venezuela which had debt crises. This reverses the ordering on this dimension. 




Our central finding is that hard currency debt alone does not always generate a 
higher likelihood of a financial crisis. Some countries in the nineteenth century with 
very high levels of original sin were less prone to debt crises than those with 
intermediate levels. In the late twentieth century, many advanced countries still have 
original sin but most have avoided severe crises. On the other hand, emerging markets 
which also suffer from original sin fell victim to debt crises and had high financial 
instability.  
The lesson from the long-run appears to be that sound debt management, and 
the development of sound fiscal and financial capacity will allow countries to escape 
financial turmoil. But we also find evidence that backing up hard currency debt with 
foreign reserves and having a larger export sector for a given level of hard currency 
debt helps decrease the incidence of debt, currency and banking crises. Mismatches 
matter. So even if countries have not yet developed the foundations of good finances, 
they can in the meantime minimize the risks of choppy financial waters by limiting 
their mismatch position. 
The interaction effects we tested for suggest to us a very visible division of 
various types of countries. Three or four categories seem to be apparent. The financial 
centers with low original sin and strong financial fundamentals obviously avoid 
crises. Other highly developed countries that are small in terms of global output, and 
carry high original sin also avoid severe financial crises. In terms of less developed 
countries, there are many which are relatively closed to external capital flows or have 
yet to kick start the development process. These countries also have original sin but 
are not too exposed to volatile capital movements. The most dangerous combination 
seems to be high original sin in an emerging market. These countries saw huge capital 
inflows in the 1880s, the late 1970s and early 1980s and again in the early 1990s. 
Their fragility to current account reversals and the virulence of crises at the end of 
each of these three major episodes is no doubt explained in part by exposure to hard 
currency liabilities. 
Given that third generation crises remain a possibility, the historical evidence 
we present suggests that better aggregate balance sheet management is necessary to 
help avoid crises. It will also keep financial turbulence from becoming a financial 
catastrophe. At the same time, history shows that in the face of hard currency debt, 
low mismatch is no substitute for the development of sound monetary, fiscal, and 
financial policies and institutions. Continued progress on this front will allow 









For the 1972-1997 sample most of our macroeconomic variables come from Bordo et. 
al. (2001) and sources are described therein. Where a variable was missing we filled it 
in according to the descriptions below and in the text. Table A.1 shows the countries 
included in our estimation samples. 
 
Debt:  
1880-1913: In general we have defined external debt or hard currency debt as the 
amount of long-term debt outstanding issued abroad plus the amount of domestic gold 
debt outstanding. Internal debt refers to the outstanding stock of domestic paper 
currency debt.  
 
1972-1997: Data are from the World Bank’s Global Development Finance database. 
This includes many varieties of international obligations including private, official 
and multilateral debt. We supplemented this with external debt values from the 
International Financial Statistics when the GDF database had missing values. 
 
Original Sin: 
One key difference between markets today and in the nineteenth century is that 
recently debt has been issued in quite a few small country currencies by agents from 
leading countries allowing opportunities for debt swaps. That is, for some countries, 
the numerator and the denominator in the difference term differ substantially because 
many other countries issue debt in their currency. To the best of our knowledge it 
does not appear that foreigners pre-1914 were issuing debt in other exotic currencies. 
In the pre-1914 case, original sin was not reduced through swaps (Flandreau, 2003 p. 
20) hence we can restrict attention in the numerator of this expression to securities 






Long-term interest rates:  
1880-1913 This is the interest rate on long-term bonds underlying data from Obstfeld 
and Taylor (2003). 
 
Exchange rate regimes:  
Data on gold standard adherence comes from data underlying Meissner (2005) 
augmented with data from Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) 
 
Default Indicator:  
1880-1913: Our default indicator equals one if there were one or more defaults prior 
to 1880.  
1972-1997: Our default indicator equals one if there were one or more defaults prior 
to 1972.  
All data is taken from a spreadsheet underlying Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano 
(2003). 
 
Crisis Dating:  
As in Bordo et. al ( 2001) we date currency and banking crises using both qualitative 
and quantitative evidence. For all countries besides Austria-Hungary, Russia, New 
Zealand, South Africa, Mexico, Turkey, Egypt, Uruguay and India we have relied on 
the dates of Bordo et. al. in both periods. In the earlier period we have tried to date 
currency crises, when possible, by using an approach based on the exchange market 
pressure (EMP) methodology which looks at changes in reserves, the exchange rate 
and the interest rate. 
Debt crisis dates were based on Beim and Calomiris (2001). Only private 
lending to sovereign nations is considered when building those default dates. Not 
every instance of technical default is included in the chronology, the authors 
identified periods (six months or more) where all or part of interest/principal 
payments were suspended, reduced or rescheduled. Some of those episodes are 
outright debt repudiations, while others were reschedulings agreed upon mutually by 
lenders and borrowers. Also data is taken from a spreadsheet underlying Reinhart, 
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Table 1 Determinants of Debt Crises, 1880-1913 
Regressors
(1) (2) (3)
Hard currency debt as 0.075** 0.061**  ---
a percentage of total debt (0.031) (0.030)
Square of hard currency  -0.073** -0.069**  ---
debt ratio (0.030) (0.027)
Debt/Revenue -0.002* -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Debt/Revenue*Pre-1880 Default 0.009*** 0.003 0.005*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Pre-1880 Default  -0.221*** -0.058 -0.129*
(0.018) (0.062) (0.074)
Mismatch 0.003  --- 0.005
(0.003) (0.005)
Square of mismatch -0.001  --- -0.001
(0.0004) (0.001)
Trade balance/GDP -0.054 0.002 0.002
(0.044) (0.055) (0.058)
Long-term interest rate 0.004 0.003** 0.005*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Consol interest rate 0.017 0.014 0.021
(0.011) (0.016) (0.017)
Gold standard dummy 0.022 0.006 0.015
(0.017) (0.013) (0.012)
Growth of the money supply -0.031 -0.020 -0.023
(0.025) (0.017) (0.016)
Gold reserves/notes in circulation -0.072** -0.034 -0.057**
(0.035) (0.028) (0.027)
Currency crisis in t 0.060** 0.031 0.075*
(0.026) (0.022) (0.041)
Currency crisis in t-1 -0.001 0.012 0.0004
(0.008) (0.016) (0.010)
Banking crisis in t 0.017 -0.004 0.038
(0.013) (0.010) (0.031)
Banking crisis in t-1 0.049 0.034 0.015
(0.033) (0.021) (0.017)
constant -4.11 -4.72 -6.33
(3.52) (2.35)** (2.77)**
Number of obs 530 530 530
Percentage of Correct Positives 83.3 66.7 83.3
Percentage of Correct Negatives 98 98.6 98.8
Psuedo R-squared 0.64 0.50 0.56
log-likelihood value -11.93 -16.3 -14.3
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for a debt crisis. Marginal effects of variables on 
the probability of a crisis are reported. Robust clustered standard errors
are in parentheses. See the text for precise definitions of variables. Positive signifies crisis year; * p-




Table 2 Determinants of Debt Crises, 1972-1997 
 
Regressors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Original Sin 0.016* 0.008* 0.002  ---
(0.010) (0.005) (0.002)
Debt/Output 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  ---
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Debt/Output*Pre-1970 Default 0.0001  ---  ---  ---
(0.0002)
Pre-1970 Default  -0.034  ---  ---  ---
(0.043)
Mismatch -0.003  ---  --- 0.020***
(0.006) (0.006)
ln (real GDP per capita)  ---  --- 0.316**  ---
(0.145)
square of ln (real GDP per capita)  ---  --- -0.019**  ---
(0.009)
Trade balance/GDP 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.0001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Long-term interest rate 0.009*** 0.006** 0.001 0.005**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
G7 average long term interest rate 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.007***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.158) (0.003)
Pegged exchange rate regime -0.033*** -0.025*** -0.018*** -0.008
(0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.015)
Currency crisis in t 0.053* 0.049* 0.054** 0.061*
(0.030) (0.029) (0.026) (0.036)
Currency crisis in t-1 0.045 0.034 0.024 0.071**
(0.028) (0.023) (0.015) (0.033)
Banking crisis in t -0.000 0.005 0.009 0.010
(0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.018)
Banking crisis in t-1 0.020 0.016 0.014 0.002
(0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.022)
constant -26.68 -26.77 -52.17 -4.42
(9.69) (9.69) (17.44) (0.63)
Number of obs 520 530 524 571
Percentage of Correct Positives 82.3 82.3 93.75 50
Percentage of Correct Negatives 93.8 93.9 95.4 91.1
Psuedo R-squared 0.50 0.49 .54 0.25
log-likelihood value -37.82 -37.8 -32.33 -64.55
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for a debt crisis. Marginal effects of variables on the probability of a 
crisis are reported. Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses. 
See the text for precise definitions of variables. Positive signifies crisis year; * p-value < 0.1; ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-

















Hard currency debt as -0.009 0.019  ---
a percentage of total debt (0.057) (0.044)
Square of hard currency  -0.003 -0.011  ---
debt ratio (0.061) (0.047)
Mismatch 0.002  --- 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Debt/Revenue -0.002 -0.001 -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Growth of terms of trade 0.524  ---  ---
(0.374)
Trade balance/GDP 0.138 0.191** 0.226***
(0.101) (0.089) (0.087)
Long-term interest rate 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Consol interest rate -0.004 0.007 0.004
(0.026) (0.023) (0.025)
Gold standard dummy 0.038  ---  ---
(0.025)
Growth of the money supply -0.051 -0.041 -0.041
(0.109) (0.067) (0.069)
Gold reserves/notes in circulation -0.052* -0.024 -0.019
(0.028) (0.023) (0.023)
Banking Crisis in t 0.035  ---  ---
(0.052)
Banking Crisis in t-1 0.084  ---  ---
(0.083)
constant -1.51 -1.79 -1.57
(1.27) (1.05) (1.05)
Number of obs 500 555 555
Percentage of Correct Positives 11.7 0 5.9
Percentage of Correct Negatives 94 98 98.8
Psuedo R-squared 0.0871 0.0479 0.053
log-likelihood value -67.72 -72.35 -71.94
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for a currency crisis. Marginal effects of variables on 
the probability of a crisis are reported. Robust clustered standard errors 
are in parentheses. See the text for precise definitions of variables.  Positive signifies crisis year. * p-









Original Sin 0.0007 0.001**  ---
(0.001) (0.001)
Mismatch 0.040***  --- 0.032***
(0.013) (0.011)
Debt/Output 0.001** 0.001*** 0.0004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.0003)
Growth of terms of trade -0.001  ---  ---
(0.002)
Trade balance/GDP -0.007** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Pegged exchnage rate regime 0.066  ---  ---
(0.057)
Long-term interest rate 0.022*** 0.012*** 0.014***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003)
G7 average long term interest rate -0.012* -0.010 -0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Growth of the money supply 0.00005*** 0.0001*** 0.00006***
(0.00001) (0.00004) (0.00001)
M2 / Reserves 0.007*** 0.007*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Banking Crisis in t -0.038  --- -0.063
(0.054) (0.048)
Banking Crisis in t-1 0.095  --- 0.096
(0.078) (0.071)
constant -2.83 -2.22 -1.76
(0.55) (0.35) (0.31)
Number of obs 419 609 641
Percentage of Correct Positives 83.6 89.4 77.9
Percentage of Correct Negatives 52.7 37.4 46.1
Psuedo R-squared 0.13 0.07 0.082
log-likelihood value -150.71 -226.56 -232.44
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for a currency crisis. Marginal effects of variables 
on the probability of a crisis are reported. Robust clustered standard errors 
are in parentheses. See the text for precise definitions of variables.  Positive signifies 








Hard currency debt as 0.018 0.035  ---
a percentage of total debt (0.075) (0.067)
Square of hard currency  -0.024 -0.037  ---
debt ratio (0.078) (0.072)
Debt/Revenue -0.002 -0.0002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Mismatch 0.004  --- 0.004
(0.003) (0.004)
Growth of terms of trade -0.592 -0.542 -0.578
(0.381) (0.378) (0.387)
Trade balance/GDP 0.364** 0.323** 0.356**
(0.176) (0.160) (0.163)
Gold standard dummy -0.006 0.000 -0.010
(0.022) (0.019) (0.020)
Growth of the money supply 0.038 0.030 0.029
(0.069) (0.071) (0.072)
Gold reserves/notes in circulation 0.025 0.026 0.038
(0.030) (0.024) (0.029)
Long-term interest rate 0.004 0.006 0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Consol interest rate 0.023 0.026 0.024
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Currency crisis in t 0.073 0.079 0.075
(0.070) (0.075) (0.072)
Currency crisis in t-1 0.072 0.068 0.073
(0.075) (0.074) (0.080)
constant -2.75 -2.94 -2.75
(0.94) (0.89) (0.92)
Number of obs 496 496 496
Percentage of Correct Positives 16.6 22.2 16.6
Percentage of Correct Negatives 96.6 96.8 96.4
Psuedo R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07
log-likelihood value -71.56 -71.99 -71.63
 Positive signifies crisis year. * p-value < 0.1; ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for a banking crisis. Marginal effects of variables 
on the probability of a crisis are reported. Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses. 








(1) (2) (3) (4)
Original Sin 0.001 0.001 0.050***  ---
(0.001) (0.001) (0.016)
Mismatch 0.017  ---  --- 0.020**
(0.011) (0.010)
Original Sin * ln(real GDP per capita)  ---  --- -0.005***  ---
(0.002)
ln(real GDP per capita)  ---  --- 0.496***  ---
(0.158)
Debt/Output -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002
(0.0005) (0.004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Growth of terms of trade -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade balance/GDP -0.006** -0.004 -0.006** -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Pegged exchnage rate regime -0.002 -0.008 -0.015 0.014
(0.023) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Growth of the money supply 0.00005* 0.00007*** 0.0007*** 0.00006*
(0.0003) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00003)
M2 / Reserves 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.00006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.00007)
Long-term interest rate 0.013*** 0.011** 0.014** 0.008*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
G7 average long term interest rate 0.0001 0.002 -0.002 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Currency crisis in t -0.015 -0.012 -0.012 -0.026
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.028)
Currency crisis in t-1 -0.021 -0.023 -0.021 -0.032
(0.032) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
constant -3.54 -3.85 -53.78 -2.72
(0.91) (1.00) (16.6) (0.58)
Number of obs 345 367 367 405
Percentage of Correct Positives 40 40 50 32
Percentage of Correct Negatives 85.8 88.1 87.3 85.5
Psuedo R-squared 0.11 0.091 0.13 0.07
log-likelihood value -68.13 -70.56 -67.18 -87.57
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for a banking crisis. Marginal effects of variables on the probability of 
a crisis are reported. Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses. 
See the text for precise definitions of variables.  Positive signifies crisis year. * p-value < 0.1; ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-




Table 7 Fixed Effects Estimations, 1880-1913 
 
Regressors Debt Crises Currency Crises Banking Crises
(1) (2) (3)
Hard currency debt as 0.112 -0.142 0.158
a percentage of total debt (0.095) (0.141) (0.152)
Square of hard currency  -0.127 -0.084 -0.150
debt ratio (0.093) (0.139) (0.152)
Debt/Revenue 0.017*** 0.0001 -0.006
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009)
Mismatch -0.001 0.012 0.027***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Square of mismatch -0.001*  ---  ---
(0.000)
Growth of terms of trade -0.303 0.716 -0.677
(0.343) (0.577) (0.591)
Trade balance/GDP -0.313* 0.030 0.405
(0.162) (0.279) (0.285)
long term interest rate 0.046*** 0.002 0.006
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Gold standard dummy -0.013 0.004 -0.076*
(0.023) (0.039) (0.039)
Growth of the money supply -0.031 -0.116 0.155
(0.055) (0.087) (0.096)
Gold reserves/notes in circulation 0.040 0.023 0.021
(0.034) (0.059) (0.060)
Consol 0.094*** -0.0001 0.055
(0.026) (0.044) (0.044)
Currency Crisis in t 0.089***  --- 0.077*
(0.027) (0.047)
Currnecy Crisis in t-1 0.034  --- 0.072
(0.029) (0.050)
Banking Crisis in t 0.011 0.041  ---
(0.025) (0.041)
Banking Crisis in t-1 0.043* 0.087**  ---
(0.024) (0.040)
constant -0.322*** 0.103 -0.106
(0.086) (0.151) (0.153)
Number of obs 478 500 496
R-squared 0.1 0.0012 0.01
F-stat 7.86*** 1.23 2.32***
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for a banking crisis. Estimation is by OLS with 
country indicators. See the text for precise definitions of variables. R-squared 




Table 8 Fixed Effects Estimations, 1972-1997 
Regressors Debt Crises Currency Crises Banking Crises
(1) (2) (3)
Mismatch -0.001 0.057** 0.031
(0.012) (0.025) (0.023)
Debt/Output 0.002*** 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade balance/GDP 0.001 -0.009** -0.005
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Growth of terms of trade  --- -0.001 -0.0006
(0.001) (0.001)
M2 / Reserves  --- -0.0 -0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0003)
G7 average long term interest rate 0.007 0.003 -0.003
(0.005) (0.012) (0.010)
Long-term interest rate 0.004 0.009 0.012
(0.005) (0.011) (0.009)
Pegged exchnage rate regime 0.005 0.047 0.010
(0.025) (0.060) (0.050)
Growth of the money supply  --- 0.00009* 0.00009
(0.00005) (0.0001)
Currency Crisis in t 0.057**  --- -0.016
(0.024) (0.040)
Currnecy Crisis in t-1 0.069***  --- -0.025
(0.023) (0.040)
Banking Crisis in t 0.007 -0.038  ---
(0.027) (0.054)
Banking Crisis in t-1 0.034 0.079  ---
(0.028) (0.056)
constant -0.167*** -0.148 -0.026
(0.045) (0.114) (0.094)
Number of obs 571 491 405
R-squared 0.09 0.05 0.02
F-stat 5.96*** 2.64*** 0.77
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for a banking crisis. Estimation is by OLS with 
country indicators. See the text for precise definitions of variables. R-squared 
is the overall R-squared. * p-value < 0.1; ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01 
 



































































































































































Notes: Data come from Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2005) 
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Figure 4 Crisis Frequencies By Country versus the Average Level of Hard 




























Notes: Crisis frequencies are calculated by dividing the number of years in which a 
country experienced a crisis by the total sample years. Both numerator and 
denominator exclude years of ongoing crisis. However, the debt crises series is 
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Note: Crisis frequencies are calculated by dividing the number of years in which a 
country experienced a crisis by the total sample years. Both numerator and 
denominator exclude years of ongoing crisis. However, alternative debt crises is the 










0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

















Alternative Debt Crises 
 41 
 
Figure 6 Marginal Effect of the Ratio of Hard Currency Debt to Total Debt 
Notes: Figures are calculated based on the model in column 1 of Table 1. Currency 
crisis indicator equals one, lagged banking crisis equals one and other variables are at 
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Notes: Figures are calculated based on the model in column 1 of Table 1. The 
probabilities are evaluated at the sample means of the control variables with the 
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Figure 8 Predicted Probabilities of a Debt Crisis, 1972-1997. 
 
Notes: Figures are calculated based on the model in column 3 of Table 2. The 
probabilities are evaluated at the sample means of the control variables with the 
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Notes: The figure shows four bands of countries. They are divided on their GDP 
measures. The first category being all country year observations where real GDP per 
capita is less than $2,900. Low OS means an observation’s average original sin was 
less than or equal to 20 percent. High original sin implies a measure of greater than 20 
percent. All measures on each axis are on the same scale.  Predicted and actual 
probabilities  are based on the 0 to 100 scale. The predicted probabilities come from 
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